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Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from 







In the presence of business groups, the expropriation through related party transactions 
(RPTs) is common and costly to minority shareholders. At the same time, it is well recognized that 
RPTs can help firms overcome market shortcomings. Using the setting of India's RPT voting rule, 
I find that a mandatory and binding shareholder voting mechanism helps filter out expropriation. 
Minority shareholders actively raise their voice against RPT resolutions, resulting in substantial 
shareholder dissent. My difference-in-difference analysis reveals that shareholder voting has a 
significant deterrence effect on RPT volume, especially on financial RPTs. I also find that stock 
prices react positively to news signaling the passage of the voting rule, and that the association 
between firm profitability and RPT increases following rule's adoption, suggesting that rule has a 
positive effect on shareholder value. Lastly, I show that mandatory RPT voting makes Indian firms 
more attractive to foreign institutional investors. 
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1. Introduction
I examine whether the adoption of mandatory shareholder voting on related party trans-
actions (RPT) reduces the expropriation of minority shareholders. In countries where compa-
nies’ ownership structure is highly concentrated, a central agency problem is how to protect
minority shareholders from expropriation attempts by controlling shareholders (La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)). Minority shareholders can be particularly vulnerable
in the presence of business groups, a common organizational form where multiple entities
are controlled by a single individual or family. The controlling shareholders have the incen-
tive to transfer resources across group firms through RPTs, ultimately to their own pockets.
Such transfer, also called “tunneling”, can take many forms, such as financial assistance,
purchasing or selling of assets, and transfer pricing. If pervasive, the fear of expropriation
can dampen corporate valuation, impede market development and even aggravate financial
crises (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002)).
Indeed, previous studies find that expropriation through RPTs is common and costly
to minority shareholders (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), Cheung, Rau, and
Stouraitis (2006), Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010)). At the same time, though, it is well rec-
ognized that when certain market mechanisms are not well developed, within-group trans-
actions can serve as alternative means to overcome these market shortcomings (Khanna and
Palepu (2000)). Consider the example of integrating a supplier and a customer into the same
group. Such integration can help secure the supply chain when contracting is costly. Because
RPTs serve important business and financing purposes whilst also providing opportunities
for a substantial transfer of wealth from minority to controlling shareholders, they present a
significant challenge for policy makers (OECD (2012)). Outright prohibition of RPTs would
be too costly, and identifying mechanisms that preserve the benefits of RPTs while limiting
their abuses has proven to be difficult.
In this paper, I investigate whether a mandatory and binding shareholder vote on RPTs
reduces the expropriation of minority shareholders, and, whether its net effect on shareholder
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value is positive. A mandatory and binding voting mechanism may affect RPTs in two ways.
First, it serves as an ex-post monitoring device that prevents transactions that shareholders
collectively view as detrimental to shareholder value. Second, a large number of votes against
a RPT resolution, even if not sufficient to outright block the RPT, can impose reputation
costs on controlling shareholders or board members, who may decide not to proceed with
the transaction or revise it based on the input received via the shareholder vote.1 The
effect of shareholder voting does not only manifest in the vote cast. In anticipation of the
potential veto and reputation cost, controlling shareholders may be deterred from proposing
transactions that would be perceived to hurt minority shareholders.
By leaving the trigger to the collective wisdom of voting shareholders, the voting mech-
anism can offer the flexibility to curb the negative effects of RPTs without disrupting their
value-creating potential. In principle, informed shareholders will only vote against trans-
actions deemed detrimental to shareholder value and support those arranged to facilitate
business strategies. In practice, however, shareholder voting may fail to fulfill such gover-
nance role for a number of reasons. First, minority shareholders may choose not to actively
exercise their voting rights because they believe that their individual vote will not affect the
voting outcome (“shareholder passivity”, Black (1990)). Overcoming this classic collective
action problem requires implicit or explicit coordination, such as collective shareholder or-
ganizations or proxy advisors, as well as a voting rule that allows minority shareholders to
have a reasonable chance to win a majority vote. Second, lack of information (e.g., opaque
disclosures on RPTs) or lack of shareholders’ sophistication may prevent shareholder votes
from successfully separating RPTs aimed at expropriation from those with a legitimate busi-
ness purpose. If so, shareholder voting may end up targeting value-creating transactions.2
1The costs of receiving strong shareholder dissent can include deteriorating trust to the controlling share-
holders, reputation and career concerns of board members, litigation risk, the risk of regulatory scrutiny and
intervention. I use the phrase “reputation cost” as a shorthand for the sum of these costs.
2This problem is exacerbated by the possibility that controlling shareholders design RPTs which at the
same time serve a valid business purpose and allow for some expropriation, leaving minority shareholders
with the choice between approving the proposed RPT in spite of expropriation or blocking it at the risk of
disrupting business operations. This is akin to the problem of “bundling”, when a management proposal
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Third, not all minority shareholders have the incentive to cast an “against” vote, because
doing so may negatively affect their relationship with management or controlling sharehold-
ers. Finally, the effectiveness of the shareholder voting threat also depends on the potential
reputation costs associated with a strong display of shareholder opposition. The presence
and extent of these costs largely depend on the specific features of the institutional setting
and information environment. Thus, whether and how greater voting rights affect RPTs and
shareholder value remains an empirical question.
To shed light on this question, I examine the adoption of a mandatory voting rule on
RPTs in India. India’s corporate sector is dominated by large business groups. A single
individual (called promoter) or family usually maintains the de facto control of all group
firms. Despite the common law heritage, the concentrated control rights, combined with
corruption and lax law enforcement, have made RPT abuse a major concern (Bertrand et al.
(2002)). In 2009, the concern escalated following the breakout of the Satyam scandal, which
was at first exposed by suspicious RPTs. In the subsequent revision of corporate law, known
as the Companies Act, 2013, the Indian legislators included a provision mandating that listed
companies seek shareholder approval for material related party transactions before they take
place. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) also adopted a similar rule in the
revised listing agreement. Under the SEBI’s rule, if a firm’s expected sum of transactions
with an individual party in a financial year exceeds 10% of the firm’s most recent total
revenue, the transactions with that party are classified as material. Importantly, the rule
only allows “disinterested” shareholders to vote, meaning that shareholders classified as
connected to the related party (typically the case for promoters) are not eligible to vote on
RPT resolutions. Hence, material RPTs must be approved by shareholders who have no
connection to the related parties.
As a first step in my empirical analysis, I use voting data to provide descriptive evidence
bundles together both value-destroying and value-creating value-destroying items (Cox, Ferri, Honigsberg,
and Thomas (2016)).
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on how shareholders vote on RPT resolutions. In a sample of 348 RPT resolutions in 2014
and 2015 (the first two years after the RPT voting rule’s implementation), I find that 9.77%
of the RPT resolutions receive more than 25% “against” votes of the votes cast from eligible
shareholders, significantly higher than the corresponding frequency of non-RPT resolutions
(0.56%) at the same firm. Notably, 7.78% for RPT resolutions fail to pass3, suggesting
that the threat of a failed vote is real.4 I then use regressions to explore the determinants
of RPT resolutions’ voting outcomes in the cross section. I find that the firm’s total RPT
volume is positively associated with the extent of shareholder dissent, suggesting shareholders
are more likely to vote against RPT resolutions proposed by firms that engage in a high
volume of RPTs. However, after decomposing the total RPT volume into operating and
financing components, I show that only financing RPT strongly predicts shareholder dissent.
Collectively, the descriptive evidence shows that in India: (i) shareholders are significantly
more likely to vote against RPTs than other proposals being voted at the same firm; (ii)
some RPT proposals are voted down, suggesting that shareholder voting can act as ex post
monitoring device and may also serve as an ex ante threat; (iii) shareholders’ votes depend
on the firm-level volume and type of RPTs, indicating at least the attempt to discern among
different types of RPTs.
In the second step, I tackle my research question more broadly by examining the voting
rule’s overall deterrence effect5 on the use of RPTs, and especially those RPTs more likely to
result in expropriation of minority shareholders. To do so, I employ a difference-in-differences
(DID) design comparing the change in volume and type of RPTs around the treatment event
3The requisite majority for RPT resolutions was initially 75% and was revised down to 50%. For other
resolutions the threshold is typically 50%.
4As a benchmark, Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch (2013) find that only 1.9% of mandatory (non-binding)
“say-on-pay” proposals in the U.S. fail to pass the 50% threshold, suggesting the dissent received by RPT
resolutions in India is high even when compared to a country and a topic (the U.S. “say-on-pay”) character-
ized by substantial activism via voting. Admittedly, the comparison is imperfect because executives can vote
on “say on pay” in the U.S., but exclusion of those votes would have only a minimal effect on the frequency
of failed “say on pay” votes.
5In this paper, I use a broad definition for deterrence, which includes both ex ante threat and realized
shareholder dissent.
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between treated and control groups. To construct a control sample, I exploit the fact that
shareholder approval is only mandatory for “material” transactions. I classify firms into the
treated group and control group based on whether their RPTs prior to the voting rule met
the materiality criteria. The underlying logic is that firms who in the past had RPTs that
would be labelled as “material” under the new rule are more likely to be affected by the
rule than firms who did not. The DID multivariate estimation shows that, controlling for
observable characteristics, the treated firms on average experience a 0.079 reduction in Total
RPT (i.e. the ratio of total RPT volume to lagged total assets) relative to the control firms,
representing a 14% percentage decrease from their pre-treatment level of 0.56.
I then investigate whether the observed effect varies by the types of RPTs. Related liter-
ature (e.g., Cheung et al. (2006), Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010)) suggests that financing RPTs
can be particularly concerning due to their ability to transfer large sums of money outside
firms’ ordinary courses of business. The previous analysis of voting outcomes also indicates
that shareholders express greater concerns about this type of transactions. Thus, I predict
that financing RPTs are more prone to being used for expropriation than operating trans-
actions, and have a larger decrease following the voting rule’s adoption. After decomposing
Total RPT into Financing RPT and Operating RPT, the DID estimation shows that Financ-
ing RPT decreases by 0.05 for the treated group relative to the control group, a 19% drop
from the pre-treatment level of 0.26. The estimated effect on Operating RPT is modest, at
0.02 and not significant at conventional levels. Overall, these results suggest that the voting
rule’s deterrence effect is not only substantial, but also varies by the nature of transactions.
Such deterrence effect is not necessarily value-creating. Managers may be reluctant to
discover or propose complex RPTs with a valid business purpose if they anticipate that
minority shareholders may not understand the transactions and vote against them. In the
next step, I study the value implication of the RPT voting rule, using two approaches. First,
I examine how stock prices react to news related to the passage of the RPT voting rule.
Overall, the market reacts positively to the key legislative milestones that signal a higher
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likelihood of the rule’s passage, implying that investors expect the voting rule to enhance
shareholder value. Investors’ ex ante expectations about the effect of regulation, though,
do not necessarily materialize. To corroborate the event study with ex post evidence of the
effect on firm value, I use the DID design to investigate changes in the association between
RPT level and firm profitability around the voting rule’s actual implementation. If the
voting rules help filter out expropriation from value-creating RPTs, the association should
become more positive (or less negative) after the new rules (Black, Kim, Jang, and Park
(2015)). Indeed, I find that treated firms experience an increase in the association between
RPT level and profitability relative to control firms.
Lastly, motivated by the finding that good corporate governance attracts institutional
investors (Ferreira and Matos (2008), Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2008)), I test whether
mandatory voting on RPT leads to higher institutional holdings. I find that treated firms
experience a significant increase in institutional ownership relative to control firms following
the voting rule’s adoption. The increase is primarily driven by foreign institutional holdings,
which increase by 0.8% for the treated firms compared to the control firms, a 21% percentage
change over the pre-treatment level (3.9%). This evidence is consistent with the notion that
foreign investors can be particularly sensitive to formal governance mechanisms such as
voting rights (Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2009)).
This study makes several contributions. First, it informs the research and policy debate
on the regulations of related party transactions. The potential abuses of RPTs are viewed
as an important policy issue around the world (OECD (2012)). Historically, in most regimes
the approval of RPTs is primarily delegated to independent directors. However, scandals
like the Satyam case suggest that, even after regulatory efforts to boost board independence
globally, director approval alone may not be sufficient to protect minority shareholders from
expropriation. Another approach has been to require greater disclosures of RPTs (e.g., IAS
24). Yet, without the power to act on the information, disclosures alone may not be sufficient
to curb abusive RPTs (OECD (2012)). Mandatory voting enables shareholders to act on
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the information from public disclosure and incentivizes them to demand more transparent
disclosures in the first place. It may also provide independent directors with the “backbone”
to oppose questionable transactions and amplify their reputation concerns. In other words,
mandatory voting can complement the effect of board independence and disclosures. Re-
latedly, my paper extends the literature examining investor protection, expropriation and
financial development (Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000), La Porta et al. (2002),
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)). While this literature documents
that stronger investor protection and better corporate governance are associated with lower
levels of expropriation in general, less is known about the exact mechanisms that can reduce
expropriation. My evidence echoes Djankov et al. (2008)’s suggestion that, among various
regulatory option to curb the self-dealing of controlling shareholders, mandatory shareholder
approval (combined with strong disclosures) can have a first-order impact.
Second, this study contributes to the literature on business groups. Many studies docu-
ment that group structure adds value to firms by providing alternatives to overcome under-
developed institutions (e.g., Khanna and Palepu (2000), Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2007)).
At the same time, a wealth of anecdotes and research also suggest that group transactions
are sometimes abused by the controlling shareholders to seek rent from the minority share-
holders (e.g., Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002), Jiang et al. (2010)). As Khanna and Yafeh (2007)
summarize, due to the multifaceted roles business groups can play, one should not one-sidedly
characterize them as either paragons or parasites. My study suggests that, by filtering out
expropriation from the transactions that serve business strategies, shareholder voting can be
a particularly useful mechanism when both elements are present.
Third, I contribute to the nascent literature of shareholder activism in emerging markets.
A sizable literature finds that shareholder voting affects corporate governance in developed
countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. (e.g., Cun˜at, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012), Ferri and
Maber (2013)). As Iliev, Lins, Miller, and Roth (2015) emphasize, due to the vast institu-
tional differences, our understanding of shareholder voting in developed markets cannot be
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easily applied to the rest of the world. For example, firms outside the U.S. and U.K. have
much more concentrated ownership (La Porta et al. (1999)). If a controlling shareholder con-
trols most of the voting shares, the voting mechanism becomes merely symbolic. In this pa-
per, I utilize a unique empirical setting where the controlling shareholders are excluded from
voting. My evidence shows that a “majority-of-minority” voting system allows shareholder
voting to be a credible threat and results in lower expropriation. This finding corroborates
the results of Fried, Kamar, and Yafeh (2018), who show that Israel’s majority-of-minority
voting regulation on executive pay curbs the compensation of controlling executives.
Lastly, I contribute to the literature on relationship between corporate governance and in-
stitutional holdings (Ferreira and Matos (2008), Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011)).
Recent papers provide causal evidence that institutional investors promote good governance
(Boone and White (2015), Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016)). My evidence is consistent
with the idea that to attract institutional investors who can act as external monitors, es-
pecially foreign institutions, policy makers need to provide robust investor protection (Leuz
et al. (2008), Kho et al. (2009)). I show that greater shareholder voting rights that empower
shareholders to tackle a major expropriation concern attract foreign institutional investors.
2. Institutional Background
The corporate sector in India is characterized by concentrated ownership and the preva-
lence of business groups. In a company, a person (or entity) who controls the firm overall is
legally defined as a promoter.6 In practice, a promoter is usually the founder of a company or
a member of the founder’s family. Within a business group, different firms can have different
promoters. However, an individual (or family) usually maintains the de facto control of all
group firms, even firms where her equity holding is relatively low. The disparity between
cash flow rights and control rights enables controlling shareholders to extract private bene-
6A company can have multiple promoters if the control is shared. In addition, persons or entities related
to the promotes through ownership or family relationship are classified as a part of the “promoter group”.
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fits by transferring resources between firms, ultimately to their own pockets.7 This practice,
widely known as tunneling, often takes the form of related party transactions (RPTs), such
as transfer pricing, inter-corporate loans and buying/selling assets (Bertrand et al. (2002)).
To protect minority shareholders from abusive RPT, the Government of India regulate
RPT through both board oversight and public disclosure. Historically, the regulation of RPT
has been governed by Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement and accounting standard AS-18.
Firstly enacted in 2001, Clause 49 is a corporate governance reform similar in spirit to the
Sarbanes-Oxley in the U.S. Clause 49 mandates listed firms to set up auditing committees
where at least two thirds of the members are independent directors. Managers are required
to disclosure details of RPTs to the auditing committees, who are in charge of reviewing the
transactions . AS-18 regulates the public disclosure of RPTs with specific definitions and
rules. Under AS-18, listed firms need to disclose details such as the nature of relationship
and the amount for each type of transactions with each related party in the footnote of
financial statements.8
These regulatory efforts, however, have not been sufficient in deterring controlling share-
holders from extracting private benefits through RPTs, as exemplified by the Satyam scandal.
Satyam Computers was an Indian technology company whose ADR was listed in NYSE. In
2008, the then controlling shareholder of Satyam Computers, Ramalinga Raju, proposed to
acquire two real estate companies (Maytas Infrastructure Ltd. and Maytas Properties Ltd.).
At that time, the Ramalinga Raju group held 36.6% of Maytas Infrastructure, an undisclosed
7Besides directly consuming firm resources, controlling shareholders may realize their private benefits in
other ways such as empire building. Another way to abuse RPTs is using them to manipulate accounting
numbers (e.g., Jian and Wong (2010), Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017)). Such manipulation may also be
related to more subtle ways of self-dealing (e.g., misleading investors for higher managerial compensations
or insider trading opportunities).
8As a benchmark, US firms are required to describe the nature and amount of RPTs in the footnotes
to the 10-K filing (per SFAS 57 of U.S. GAAP). In 2014, PCAOB adopted Auditing Standard No. 18
to strengthen the audit procedures for RPTs. Also, the SEC mandates RPT disclosures in proxy filings
(the 2006 SEC disclosures call for greater disclosures about the RPT approval process). See Ryngaert and
Thomas (2012) and Lu (2017) for a discussion of the SEC disclosure rule. IFRS also mandate the disclosure
of RPT in financial statements, as outlined in IAS 24. For an overview of how U.S. institutions deal with
“tunneling” in a broader sense, see Atanasov, Black, and Ciccotello (2011).
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stake in Maytas Properties, and only 8.6% of Satyam Computers. The transactions, expected
to transfer USD 1.6 billion from Satyam Computers to the two real estate companies, were
approved by the Satyam’s independent directors. The investors, however, seriously doubted
the motivation behind the acquisitions, sending the price of Satyam’s ADR down by 55% on
the announcement day, forcing the deal to a halt. Subsequent investigations revealed that
Satyam had for many years engaged in accounting fraud that fabricated over USD 1 billion
cash balance (which eventually led to the prosecution and conviction of Ramalinga Raju and
a wave of resignation from Satyam directors).
Following the Satyam scandal, the investor communities in India and around the world
(e.g., CFA Institute (2009), OECD (2009)) voiced their concerns with abusive RPTs, inad-
equate board oversight, and more generally the limited accountability of controlling share-
holders. In response to these concerns, the legislators in India included updated corporate
governance provisions in the ongoing revision of the company law, known as the Compa-
nies Act 2013. With a broad scope, the 2013 Act touches areas such as shareholder voting,
director compensation, corporate social responsibility and board diversity.9
Sections 188 of the 2013 Act requires material related party transactions to be approved
by minority shareholders (after being approved by the board). The Security and Exchange
Board of India (SEBI) followed up to include a similar shareholder approval provision in the
revised Clause 49 of the listing agreement10. Under the SEBI’s rule, if a firm’s expected total
transaction amount with a particular related party in a financial year exceeds 10% of the
firm’s most recent annual revenue, all the transactions with that party must have a priori
shareholder approval. The minimum approval threshold was initially set at 75% for votes
9In Section 5.1, I discuss in detail other corporate governance provisions of the 2013 Act and how I control
for their potential confounding effects.
10Both the 2013 Act and the SEBI’s rule mandate shareholder approval for material RPTs, but the SEBI
rule is considered more stringent in several aspects. First, the SEBI rule uses a broader definition of related
party and related party transactions. Second, the 2013 Act exempt transactions under “ordinary course of
business” or “arms-length basis”, whereas the SEBI rule does not make the exceptions. Third, the two rules
differ in the definition of material transactions, where the SEBI’s threshold is tighter in general. Therefore
in this paper I used SEBI’s materiality threshold for the empirical analysis. For simplicity, hereafter I refer
the provision in the 2013 Act and SEBI rule collectively as “the voting rule”.
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of the eligible votes cast and was revised to 50% one year after the rule came into effect.
Furthermore, only “disinterested” shareholders are eligible to vote on RPT resolutions, which
means promoters usually cannot vote as they are often connected to the related parties.11
Due to the concentrated ownership of Indian companies, the “majority-of-minority” feature
of the voting rule significantly amplifies the voting power of minority shareholders.12
The Indian setting is suitable for answering my research questions for several reasons.
First, the dominance of business groups with concentrated control rights gives promoters
strong incentive to expropriate minority shareholders through RPTs. At the same time, the
potential loss to minority shareholders is large enough to give them incentives to overcome
their passivity and actively exercise their voting powers. Second, the Indian RPT voting
rule is mandatory (thus mitigating selection bias) and the voting outcome is legally binding,
which implies that minority shareholders do not rely on the reputation impact alone to stop
RPTs, as would be the case with advisory votes. Third, the Indian RPT voting rule explicitly
excludes controlling shareholders connected to the related parties from voting, making the
rule particularly protective to minority shareholders. This feature also provides shareholders
with stronger incentives to gather information, coordinate and cast an informed vote. Finally,
the focus on material party transactions allows me to identify a suitable control sample in
my research design, as discussed in detail in Section 5.
11When the rule first came into effect, the general interpretation was that all promoters have to abstain
from voting. The lawmakers later clarified that promoters proven to have no connection with the related
parties can vote. However, such cases are uncommon. By the same logic, non-promoters shareholders who
are connected to the related parties are not allowed to vote. Practically, the task of verifying voting eligibility
belongs to the scrutinizer, an outside party appointed by the board to monitor the voting process and validate
the votes. Public accountants and professional company secretaries are frequently used as scrutinizers.
12See Enriques (2015) for a discussion of the “majority-of-minority” voting rule proposed by the European
Commission. Another example of a similar voting rule is the Australian “say on pay” (SOP) regime, where




I develop the predictions tested in this paper based on the frameworks in Johnson et al.
(2000) and La Porta et al. (2002). In these models, a controlling shareholder can extract
private benefits by stealing a fraction of firm profits (or investment). The stealing, however, is
subject to a private cost which is a function of the amount stolen and the strength of investor
protection. In equilibrium, the controlling shareholder chooses the level of expropriation that
equates the marginal private benefit to the marginal cost.
Although the models do not feature shareholder voting, a voting rule can enter the
framework in two ways. First, a voting rule can serve as an ex-post monitoring mechanism
that can probabilistically undo the controlling shareholders’ stealing. The voting outcome
should be determined by the percentage of against votes, which in turn can be thought as
a noisy measure of the stealing level. If the realized percentage of against votes exceeds
the requisite majority and the voting outcome is binding, the stealing is completely undone.
Second, the public disclosure of the voting outcome can impose a reputation cost to the
controlling shareholder. If a firm discloses a high level of against votes, even if not sufficient
to block the transaction, shareholders may react negatively by selling shares or applying
stronger scrutiny in the future. Similarly, strong shareholder dissent can push independent
directors (concerned with their reputation) and regulators to apply more stringent oversight
that leads to a higher cost of future expropriation. The reputation costs should also increase
with the percentage of against votes.
Under the shareholder voting regime, a controlling shareholder who proposes a positive
amount of stealing would face a probability of veto and a reputation cost. In response to the
threat of veto and reputation costs, the controlling shareholders would not propose RPTs
that are likely to attract strong a high level of against votes. Taken together, the RPT voting
rule should reduce the level of RPT-related expropriation through both realized veto and
deterrence.
To illustrate the framework, first consider the baseline model of La Porta et al. (2002).
12
A controlling shareholder with cash flow rights α can choose to expropriate a fraction (s) of
the firm’s investment subject to a private cost c(k, s). If the amount of investment and the
gross return are both normalized to 1, the controlling shareholder’s payoff is
α(1 − s) + s− c(k, s),
where the first term is his after-theft dividends, the second term is the private benefit of
expropriation and the third term is the private cost, an increasing function of s and the
general investor protection k.13 This is the same expression as equation (2) of La Porta
et al. (2002). Assuming a quadratic cost function c(k, s) = 1
2
ks2, k > 0, the first order





Now I modify the set up by introducing shareholder voting when the expropriation is
proposed but not yet executed. Let p(v, s) denote the probability of vetoing the transaction,
where s still represents the expropriation level and v captures the strength of the voting rule
and shareholder participation. Assume p increases monotonically with s (i.e. more serve
expropriations are more likely to be blocked).14 Let r(d, p) be the expected reputation cost
from the public disclosure of the voting outcome, which monotonically increases with p. d
is a parameter that captures the sensitivity of reputation cost to the voting outcome, which
can be thought as public awareness or media coverage. Under the shareholder voting regime,
the expected payoff to the controlling shareholder is given by
αp(v, s) + (1 − p(v, s))(α(1 − s) + s) − c(k, s) − r(d, p),
13La Porta et al. (2002) call c(k, s) the cost of-theft function, which is the resource the controlling share-
holder has to waste in order to steal s. One such example is bribing the regulator.
14Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) use a similar idea to formulate investor protection in a formal model.
13
where the first term is his dividend payoff if the expropriation is vetoed, times the probability
of veto; the second terms is the sum of dividend and private gain if the expropriation goes
through, times the probability of going through; the last two terms are the standard cost-
of-theft in La Porta et al. (2002) and expected reputation cost from voting, respectively.
The difference between the two costs is that c measures the cost of expropriation from
institutions that exist prior to the voting rule’s adoption, while r represents the incremental
costs that are attributed to the disclosure of voting outcomes.15 Both costs will incur as long
as the expropriation is proposed, irrespective of whether shareholders eventually veto it. To




d(vs)2, d > 0.16 The




k + 2v(1 − α) + dv2 ,
which is strictly lower than the equilibrium expropriation level under the regime with no
shareholder voting.17 The first term of the denominator corresponds to the deterrence from
general investor protection; the second term corresponds to the deterrence from veto; the
third term corresponds to the deterrence from the reputation cost of disclosing the voting
outcome.
Prediction 1: Mandatory voting on RPT leads to lower level of RPT.
Despite the intuitive theoretical argument, as noted in the Introduction, there are sev-
eral reasons why the voting rule may not have a significant effect on RPT in practice. First,
investors may choose not to actively exercise their voting rights if they are not convinced
15Another approach is to incorporate reputation cost from voting into the cost-of-theft function c(k, s).
To illustrate the specific effect of the voting rule, I deliberately separate the two costs in the expected payoff
to the controlling shareholder. The parameter k of c(k, s), the general investor protection level, does not
include the voting rule.
16Although the solution depends on the function form assumptions, the observation that the equilibrium
expropriation level is lower under the shareholder voting regime is robust to the assumptions.
17Under the voting regime, the realized expropriation (on average) is even lower than the proposed level
due to the probability of veto.
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that their individual vote may affect the voting outcome. Second, RPTs can serve a number
of valid purposes that are independent from expropriation (Khanna and Yafeh (2007)). If
shareholders lack the information or sophistication to identify RPTs driven by expropriation
motives, or if “good” and “bad” RPTs are bundled in the same resolution, shareholders may
not raise their concerns through voting even if they are aware of the potential expropria-
tion. Third, some investors may be concerned about the negative side effects of casting an
“against” vote, such as a deteriorating relationship with the controlling shareholder. Some
of these problems may be reduced by the presence of information intermediaries, such as
proxy advisors, who enjoy economies of scale in information gathering and may specialize
in analyzing the value implications of RPTs. However, proxy advisors are known to have
their own incentives problems. For example, they are accused of developing “one-size-fits”
all recommendations as a way to avoid costly firm-specific analyses. Nor it is clear that
they have the expertise to perform the in-depth analysis required to sort out the nature of
complex RPT transactions, which are often accompanied by incomplete disclosures.18
Next, I investigate how the deterrence effect varies by the type of transactions. If share-
holders vote selectively to filter out value-destroying transactions from the rest, the deter-
rence effect should be stronger on RPTs that are more susceptible to expropriation. The
literature documents that financing RPTs that can transfer large amounts of cash outside
normal operations may be key suspects. For example, Cheung et al. (2006)) examine the mar-
ket reactions to RPT disclosures made by firms listed in Hong Kong and find the acquisition
and sale of assets and equity are associated with significant negative stock return. Jiang et al.
(2010) document that the controlling shareholders of Chinese listed firms use inter-corporate
loans to tunnel away billions of RMB from the companies. To further understand what types
of transaction raises shareholder concerns in my setting, I read in detail ISS reports for the
shareholder meetings where RPT resolutions received “against” recommendation from ISS
18In addition, proxy advisors can be subject to other concerns such as conflict of interest due to their
consulting businesses, lack of accountability and transparency, and significant pressure from organized labor
groups (Ertimur et al. (2013), Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal (2015), Li (2016))
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or were rejected by shareholders. The reports reveal that the primary determinant of the
recommendation is whether the underlying transaction is justifiable given the company’s
normal course of business. Financial transactions, such as inter-corporate loans and the
purchase or sale of assets, frequently raise concerns as they often exist independent from
the companies’ core business models19. In addition, unlike operating transactions such as
sales of goods, the terms of financial transactions are more difficult to benchmark against
arms-length standards. Indeed, the ISS reports often note the lack of adequate disclosures
to help shareholders assess the validity of financing RPTs. The above argument lead to my
second prediction:
Prediction 2: The reduction of RPTs following mandatory voting is primarily driven
by financing RPTs.
If the RPT voting rule deters expropriation, it should raise corporate valuation (La Porta
et al. (2002)). Ideally, enhanced voting rights should monotonically improve shareholder
value, as rational shareholders will not vote to the detriment of shareholder value. In prac-
tice, however, a number of frictions may cause enhanced voting rights not to improve (or
even destroy) shareholder value. For example, if shareholders do not adequately distinguish
legitimate transactions from those aimed at their expropriation, the voting rule may risk
disrupting the value-enhancing role of RPTs (Enriques (2015)). In addition, the voting rule
may introduce a hold-up problem that negatively affects managerial incentive. For example,
if a manager knows that her project choice could be overruled by shareholders, she may
exert less effort to discover profitable investment projects ex ante (e.g., Aghion and Tirole
(1997)). Ultimately, while the RPT voting rule is designed to protect minority shareholders,
how the rule affects shareholder value remains an empirical question. I study this questions
using two approaches. First, I examine how stock prices react to news related to the passage
of the voting rule. If investors anticipate the voting rule to have an overall positive effect on
19My conversation with ISS analysts and an Indian corporate lawyer also confirms the observation.
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shareholder value, the stock prices should react positively to events that signal a higher the
likelihood of the rule’s adoption.
Prediction 3: The stock market responds positively to the news that signals the passage
of mandatory voting on RPT.
Testing the above prediction speaks to investors’ perceptions of the expected effect of the
voting rule. However, it does not necessarily captures how the rule contributes to share-
holder value ex post, when it is adopted and enforced. Thus following Black et al. (2015), I
complement the event study by examining how the voting rule affect the association between
RPT level and firm profitability. This association reflects the nature of the RPTs, which, as
discussed earlier, can have an expropriation component and a value-enhancing component.
While the expropriation component drives the association between RPT and profitability to
the negative side20, the value-enhancing RPTs push the association to the positive direction.
If the voting rule primarily curbs expropriation, I expect the association between RPT and
firm profitability to increase (i.e. becoming more positive or less negative). In contrast,
if the threat of shareholder dissent also affects the use of legitimate RPTs, the association
between RPT and profitability may not increase, and may even decrease.
Prediction 4: Mandatory voting on RPT results in a stronger association between RPT
level and firm profitability.
The literature posits a dynamic relationship between corporate governance and institu-
tional holdings. While institutional investors as external monitors can promote good corpo-
rate governance (Aggarwal et al. (2011), Boone and White (2015), Appel et al. (2016)), they
also prefer to invest in better governed firms in the first place (Ferreira and Matos (2008),
Leuz et al. (2008)). I use the mandatory RPT voting setting as an exogenous shock to test
whether greater voting rights attract more institutional investors. With relatively larger
20Certain types of tunneling, such as equity dilution and forced buyback (“freezeout”), do not necessarily
affect firm ROA. See Atanasov, Black, Ciccotello, and Gyoshev (2010) for more discussion.
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stake, more sophisticated approaches to voting, and possibly more economies of scale due to
holdings in many firms, institutions are more likely to benefit from the voting rights than
individuals (Gillan and Starks (2000), McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016)). In addition,
I expect the effect to be stronger for foreign institutional holdings. Local investors, because
of proximity, have a comparative advantage in acquiring information and accessing infor-
mal monitoring mechanisms, such as private conversations (Giannetti and Simonov (2006),
Kho et al. (2009)). Foreign investors, on the other hand, may rely more on formal investor
protection mechanisms such as shareholder voting.
Prediction 5: Both domestic and foreign institutional investors increase their holdings
following mandatory voting on RPT. The increase is more pronounced for foreign institu-
tional investors.
4. How Are RPT Resolutions Voted?
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
As a first step of my analysis, I examine how RPT resolutions were voted after the
rule came into effect in 2014. Inspecting realized voting outcomes provide direct evidence
of whether and how shareholders used their enhanced voting right to identify questionable
RPTs, which in turn may help complement and interpret the subsequent analyses on the
voting rule’s deterrence effect.
I acquire voting data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a leading international
proxy advisor. For each resolution, the data set contains information about date, type of
resolutions, manager and ISS recommendation, and voting outcome. The data set covers
660 and 762 Indian firms for which ISS provided voting guidelines in calendar year 2014
and 2015, respectively (approximately 10%–15% of the total number of firms listed in India
at that time). During this period, 348 RPT resolutions from 226 firm-years (206 unique
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firms) were voted. I then merge the voting dataset with the Prowess database to obtain
financial information about the sample firms. Table I provides descriptive statistics. Panel
A compares 348 RPT resolutions (at the firm-party level) to the other resolutions voted
in the same firm-years. The within-firm-year approach naturally control for firm-specific
characteristics (e.g., ownership composition) that may affect the voting outcomes. Panel B
reports summary statistics of firm characteristics.
The first notable finding from Table I is that RPT resolutions are more likely to receive
shareholder dissent relative to other resolutions. The average percentage of votes against
RPT resolutions is 8.03%, versus 1.85% for non-RPT resolutions. 9.77% (4.02%) of RPT
resolutions receive at least 25% (50%) against votes of the votes cast, while the correspond-
ing frequencies of non-RPT resolutions is only 0.56% (0.30%). The difference between RPT
resolutions and others is partly driven by the “majority-of-minority” feature of RPT res-
olutions that prohibits controlling shareholders who are connected to the related parties
from voting. As shown in Panel A, votes cast divided by shares outstanding is about 33%
for RPTs versus about 70% for other resolutions, mainly due to the absence of controlling
shareholders. However, even after controlling for this effect, RPT resolutions receive twice
as large voting dissent. After accounting for differences in eligible votes, the 8.03% of “votes
against” in Panel A translates to about 2.7% of total shares (= 8.03% × 33.46%), versus
about 1.3% for non-RPT resolutions (= 1.85% × 70.54%). Taken together, the strong dis-
sent on RPT resolutions is attributed to both the “majority-of-minority” feature and that
minority shareholders cast against votes actively.
A second key finding in Table I is that RPT resolutions do fail (7.76% of them)21, sug-
gesting that the threat of a RPT resolution being blocked by shareholders under the voting
regime is real and thus making the evidence of a deterrence effect (examined later) more
21As mentioned earlier, the requisite majority to pass RPT resolution was initially set as 75% by both the
2013 Act and the SEBI’s rule, and was revised to 50% in September 2015. In my sample, the revision only
affects the second half of financial year 2016 (April 2015–March 2016). As a result, the number of failed
RPT resolutions is in between the number of resolutions with 25% against and with 50% against votes.
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plausible.22
4.2. Mini Case Studies
Case 1: United Spirits Ltd.
United Spirits was the flagship company of the United Breweries Group, an Indian bev-
erage conglomerate. The group was controlled by Vijay Mallya, an entrepreneur famous for
his extravagant lifestyle (Stacey (2017)). In 2012, Diageo, a British alcoholic beverage giant,
agreed to acquire a majority stake at United Spirits by purchasing shares from the United
Breweries Group. By 2014, Diageo had become the controlling shareholder of United Spirits,
while Vijay Mallya remained the Chairman of the company.
In November 28, 2014, United Spirits held an extraordinary shareholder meeting to seek
approval for 11 related party transaction resolutions. The proposed transactions range from
loans, sales of goods, transferring assets, trademark licensing, and advertising deals. The
promoter group (including Diageo and Vijay Mallya’s UB group), which collectively held
over 55% of outstanding shares, abstained from the voting because they were connected to
the related parties. To the surprise of the promoters, minority shareholders expressed a
tremendous level of dissent by rejecting 9 of the 11 RPT resolutions. Among the rejected
resolutions, 5 received over 50% against votes of votes cast.23 In response to the voting
outcome, United Spirits scaled down RPTs in several categories such as loans, dividends and
guarantees, providing substantially more disclosures in its subsequent annual report.24 At
the same time, the company booked additional loan loss provisions for several related parties,
22Failed RPT resolutions are not a necessary condition for the deterrence effect to occur. In equilibrium,
managers will not propose resolutions not expected to pass. Thus, mandatory voting may be effective even
if there is no evidence of ex post voting dissent. In practice however, when a new voting rule is adopted,
some managers may not immediately and fully anticipate shareholders’ reaction and can propose resolutions
that are rejected by shareholders. Studies on “say on pay” show that in the early years there are always a
few cases of failed say on pay proposals (e.g., Ferri and Maber (2013), Ertimur et al. (2013)).
23The requisite majority was 75% at the time.
24An excerpt of the RPT disclosure and voting outcomes is shown as an example in Internet Appendix.
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suggesting the intention to write off some existing inter-corporate lending. In financial year
2016, United Spirits further expanded the disclosure of RPTs by providing a brief justification
for each non-arms-length transaction.
After the embarrassing defeat, the conflict between Vijay Mallya and Diageo intensified.
An internal investigation led by Diageo found that Vijay Mallya had been improperly trans-
ferring United Spirits funds to his struggling Kingfisher Airlines and other businesses (Rana
(2016)). The board eventually forced Vijay Mallya to resign from Chairman, conditional on
a $75 million severance package and other benefits. However, the Debt Recovery Tribunal
halted the severance package at the request of the creditors who pursued debt recovery from
the companies Vijay Mallya managed. In March 2016, Vijay Mallya allegedly left India to
escape the law suits right before his arrest warrant was issued.
Case 2: Repco Home Finance Ltd.
Repco Home Finance is a listed housing finance company that provides home loan prod-
ucts to individual borrowers. The company is promoted by Repco Bank, a government
controlled bank with 37% ownership in Repco Home Finance. Repco Home Finance has
historically engaged in large related party transactions, primarily in the form of receiving
loans from Repco Bank. However, the structure or the interest rate of those borrowings were
not disclosed in annual reports.
In 2015, Repco Home Finance sought shareholder approval for related party transactions
with Repco Bank. The resolution covered up to INR 30 billion of loans, overdraft facilities,
deposits, interest, and rent payment. However, neither the minority shareholders nor the
proxy advisors were convinced of the necessity or the fairness of the transactions. For
example, ISS expressed concern over the vague disclosure of the RPTs, stating that “the
company has provided limited disclosure on the loan arrangement and rent agreement to be
carried out under the proposed mandate. The details of these transactions to be conducted
and processes through which ensure the fairness of these transactions have not been made
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available.” The shareholders rejected the resolutions in the annual meeting in September
2015, and again in a special voting in December 2015. In March 2016, the resolution finally
passed with the requisite majority after a revision that cut the total transaction amount
(including the existing transactions) from the original INR 30 billion to INR 6.5 billion. In
the 2016–2017 annual report, Repco Home Finance enhanced the disclosure on its borrowing
positions by tabulating the distribution of interest rates for each maturity interval and loan
type. The report also included a detailed discussion of the firm’s RPT policies. Notably, the
RPT footnote shows that the closing balance of the accounts with Repco Bank had little
change from the previous year, suggesting that almost no new transactions were carried out
during the period.
4.3. The Determinants of Voting Outcomes
Next, I explore how RPT resolutions are voted by regressing voting outcomes to lagged
firm characteristics. The first dependent variable is the percentage of against votes of total
votes cast. An alternative dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the resolution
receives more than 25% against votes, and zero otherwise. The independent variables include
lagged RPT (scaled by total assets), natural log of total assets, lagged ROA and lagged ex-
cess returns, promoter ownership, domestic institutional ownership, and foreign institutional
ownership. Ideally, I would like to also include the characteristics of each proposed trans-
action, but this data is not available. I use linear models with OLS for continuous outcome
variables and use logit models with maximum-likelihood estimation for binary outcome vari-
ables. Since one firm can have multiple RPT resolutions, I cluster standard errors at firm
level to account for within-firm correlation in residuals.
Table II reports the results. Column 1 shows that, conditional on size, performance and
ownership structure, firms with higher RPT levels in the past receive more “against” votes
on average. In Column 2, I split total RPT into the operating component and the financing
component. As detailed in the Appendix, I classify loans, purchasing/selling of assets or
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investment, dividends, interest payments, and capital issuance as Financing RPT. The rest
are classified as Operating RPT. Interestingly, Financing RPT has significant predictive
power on shareholder dissent while Operating RPT does not. A one standard deviation
(0.113) increase in lagged Financing RPT is associated with a 3.2% increase in the percentage
of against votes, corresponding to a 40 percentage difference from the unconditional mean
(8.03%). In Column 3, I include the indicator of ISS “against” recommendation as an
additional independent variable. The purpose is to see whether the association between
past RPT level and voting outcome still holds conditional on ISS recommendation. Notably,
receiving “against” recommendation from ISS is associated with an 13.9% increase in against
votes. However, even controlling for ISS recommendation, lagged Financing RPT continues
to predict the probability of shareholder dissent. In Column 4–6, I use the indicator of
receiving more than 25% against votes as an additional measure of shareholder dissent. The
results from logit regression are consistent with Column 1–3. To interpret the magnitude,
take the estimates in Column 5 for example. Setting all variables to sample mean, the
conditional probability of receiving more than 25% against votes is 5.3%. Holding everything
else constant, raising lagged Financing RPT by one standard deviation is associated with an
over 100% increase in the conditional probability (to 11.0%).
Motivated by the observation that ISS recommendation strongly predicts voting out-
comes, in Column 7 and 8, I examine the determinants of ISS voting recommendations. The
result shows that only lagged Financing RPT is positively associated with the probability of
receiving against recommendation.
Overall, the results suggest that voting shareholders and proxy advisors are more likely to
oppose resolutions from firms with high financing RPTs in the past. This suggests either that
they use a high level of financing RPTs in the past to identify questionable transactions, or,
more likely, that firms with high financing RPTs tend to submit resolutions that shareholders
and proxy advisors view as value-destroying.
Another interesting finding from Table II is that foreign institutional ownership is strongly
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and positively associated the probability of shareholder dissent. In contrast, the association
between domestic institutional holdings and the probability of shareholder dissent is not
significant. The result suggests that foreign investors on average are more likely to cast
against votes to RPT resolutions (even after controlling for recommendations by ISS, which
are likely to be followed by many foreign investors).25 The significantly negative coefficient
on Past ROA and shareholder dissent indicates that shareholder are more likely to vote
against RPT resolutions when firm performance is weak. One possible explanations is that
poor profitability signals that firm profits are tunneled away through RPTs (Bertrand et al.
(2002)). Another possibility is that when firms become less profitable due to exogenous rea-
sons, controlling shareholders have greater incentives to expropriate firm resources, because
the opportunity cost of expropriation (i.e. investing in the firm) is lower (Johnson et al.
(2000)).
To sum up, the descriptive analysis offers two important observations. First, voting
dissent on (and proxy advisors’ scrutiny of) on RPT resolutions is substantially higher than
non-RPT resolutions. The higher dissent is explained by both the “majority-of-minority”
feature of the RPT voting rule and that minority shareholders more actively vote against
RPT resolutions. Second, the voting outcomes depend on the extent to which firms used
RPTs, and especially financing RPTs, in the past, consistent with the evidence that such
RPTs are more susceptible to be used by controlling shareholders to expropriate minority
shareholders’ wealth, and that firms with large use of financing RPT draw larger scrutiny.
25However, the result should not be interpreted as that domestic institutions do not actively vote on RPT
resolutions. Given the relatively low holdings of foreign institutions, the observed shareholder dissent is
likely attributed to both domestic and foreign institutions.
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5. The Deterrence Effect of RPT Voting
5.1. Sample and Research Design
Detecting the overall deterrence effect of shareholder voting is challenging because the
counterfactual cannot be observed. In other words, given the voting requirement, it is impos-
sible to observe how much RPT will be carried out in the absence of the voting requirement.
To tackle this challenge, I use a difference-in-difference (DID) design that compares the
change in RPTs between treated firms (i.e. those affected by the rule) and control firms (i.e.
those not affected by the rule). The DID design effectively assumes that the post-regulation
pattern in RPT for control firms is indicative of what we would have observed for treatment
firms absent the voting requirement. Because all publicly listed firms were subject to the new
voting requirement, I exploit the fact that the mandatory voting requirement only applies
to “material” RPTs, where materiality is defined by the size of the transactions.
Specifically, I first classify as “material” all the RPTs taking place before the new rule
that would have been classified as material transactions under the new rule. As detailed in
Appendix A, for firm i in financial year t, a related party of firm i is classified as “material”
if firm i’s total transaction amount with the party during year t exceeds 10% of firm i’s most
recent revenue. The “material RPT” for firm i year t is the sum of transactions with all
“material” parties.26 Appendix B provides a simple example to illustrate the construction.
Next, I classify as “treated” firms all firms that had “material” transactions every year
during the three-year period prior to the new rule. All other firms are defined as “control”
firms.27 The idea behind this classification is that firms consistently engaging in material
RPTs in the past are likely to continue the existing practice in the absence of regulatory
change. When the voting rule comes into effect, these firms are more likely to be affected.
26One caveat of this approach is that the threshold of voting rule is by nature based on the expected
contractual amount, not realized transaction volume (which forms the data I use). Thus, my measure of
“material” RPT is a proxy for the RPT contracts that would be labelled as “material”.
27In a robustness test, I obtain similar results when including in the control group only firms without any
material RPTs in the three-year period prior to the new rule.
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Firms that never or infrequently have material RPT are less likely to be affected. In other
words, I classify firms into treated and control based on how likely their existing RPT
practices are impacted by the rule.28 If the voting rule deters RPT, then the firms most
affected by the rule (treated firms) should experience a decrease in RPTs compared to the
firms least affected by the rule (control firms).29
I obtain data on financial statements, stock returns, equity ownership and corporate
governance from Prowess, a database maintained by the Center for Monitoring the Indian
Economy (CMIE). Prowess covers both listed and large unlisted firms in India. The related
party transactions data are captured by CMIE from the RPT disclosure in annual reports
mandated by Accounting Standard 18 (AS-18). AS-18 requires listed firms to disclose in the
footnotes of financial statements the aggregate amount transacted with each related party
for each type of transactions. The United Spirits RPT footnote shown in Internet Appendix
is an example of this disclosure.
To construct the sample, I focus on a five-year window around the adoption of the
mandatory voting rule. The pre-treatment period consists of 2012, 2013 and 2014, and the
post-treatment period includes 2015 and 2016.30 I start with listed domestic Indian firms in
the Prowess Universe that have financial information from 2012 to 2016. I delete observations
with missing key variables necessary for the regressions. To focus on firms with significant
RPT volume, I exclude firms whose average total RPT volume is less than 1% of total assets
28Since the treated and control firms differ in the probability of receiving treatment, my approach is
essentially a “fuzzy” difference-in-difference design. See Armstrong, Glaeser, and Huang (2017) for more
discussion and Ferri and Li (2017) for another application. Similarly, Atanasov, Black, et al. (2016) denote
DID strategies with continuous cross-sectional variation as “DID-continuous”. For the ease of notation, I
still use the term “treated” to describe firms who are more likely to be affected by the rule and the term
“control” for the rest of the firms.
29One caveat is that the theory predicts that mandatory voting deters the level of expropriation through
RPT. However, a reduction in expropriation may not always translate into a reduction in the level of RPT.
The controlling shareholder may reduce expropriation by adjusting the term of RPT without changing the
level. Thus, if empirical result does not show that RPT level drops, one cannot conclude that the voting
rule does not deter expropriation without further investigation.
30Because India financial years usually start in April 1st and end in March 31st, the pre-treatment period
effectively starts in April 2011 and ends in March 2014; the post-treatment period starts in April 2014 (when
the voting rule first came into effect) and ends in March 2016.
26
in the pre-treatment period. The final sample consists of 7,743 firm-year observations from
1,716 unique firms (360 treated firms and 1,356 control firms).
To estimate the deference effect, I use the following fixed effects regression model
Yit = β1Treatedi × Postt + γXit + ηt + δi + it, (1)
where Yit is the outcome of interest for firm i in year t. Treatedi is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if firm i belongs to the treatment group as defined above. Postt is an indicator
that takes value of 1 for observations in financial year 2015 and 2016, and 0 otherwise. Xit
is a vector of control variables to control for observable firm characteristics. I use two sets
of control variables. The first set, which I call basic controls, includes total assets (log),
leverage and, lagged annual excess return.31 As discussed in detail below, the second set,
which I call additional controls, is used to account for contemporaneous changes in corporate
governance regulations. The definitions of all variables are presented in Appendix A. ηt and
δi represent year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. it is the error term. Treatedi and Postt
do not enter the regression separately because they are absorbed by firm fixed effects and
year fixed effects, respectively. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. The key coefficient of interest is β1, which measures the change in Yit following the
RPT voting rule for the treated group relative to the control group.
With the additional controls, I explicitly control for contemporaneous regulatory changes
that may have affected treated and control firms differently. While the 2013 Act introduced
a series of changes in corporate governance, I do not expect them (besides the voting rule)
to have a first order impact on RPT. I nevertheless include the following control variables
31In the baseline regression, I do not control for accounting profitability and ownership variables, as
they will be later used as outcome variables. Including potential outcome variables as controls may give
biased results. As a robustness check, I nontheless report the results after including one-year-lagged ROA,
promoter ownership and institutional ownership in Internet Appendix. In addition, in my matched sample
analysis (also in Internet Appendix), I match on pre-treatment ROA and ownership variables, among other
characteristics.
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for four important provisions: mandatory auditor rotation32, mandatory woman director33,
executive pay cap34, and mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) expenditure35.
To account for these changes, I include the following control variables: an auditor turnover
indicator, the percentage of new directors, board independence, auditing committee inde-
pendence, the natural logarithm of CEO (or the highest paid executive) total pay and CSR
expenditure (scaled by total assets). Because only 75% of the observations in the sample
have non-missing data for all the additional control variables, I first report regression results
without additional controls for the full sample and then with additional controls for the
smaller sample.
The key identification assumption of the DID framework is the parallel trend assumption,
which states that the outcome variable of treated and control firms would trend similarly in
the absence of the treatment. Although this assumption cannot be directly verified, I use
the following alternative DID regression to examine whether the trends between treated and




βkTreatedi × FY (k)t + γXit + ηt + δi + it, (2)
32The mandatory auditor rotation provision under the 2013 Act forbid listed firms and large unlisted firms
from having the same external auditing firm for 10 consecutive years. In addition, firms cannot have the
same individual as external auditor for more than 5 consecutive years. The provision first went into effect
in April 1st, 2017, which means firms that have the same auditing firms for more than 10 consecutive years
by April 2017 should switch auditing firm in financial year 2018. Therefore, this regulation does not directly
affect my sample period.
33The 2013 Act and a SEBI rule require all listed firms to appoint at least one woman on their boards
(either as insider or outsider) by April 2015. Although the provision may not have a strong impact on
overall board composition, I control for the percentage of newly appointed director, board independence and
auditing committee independence as precautionary measures for the potential confounding effect. The other
provisions in the 2013 Act related to board composition were largely already in effect for listed companies
as per the existing listing agreement.
34The provision in the 2013 Act mandates that the total compensation to managers and directors must
not exceed 11% of the company’s net profits during the financial year. For individual manager/director,
the threshold is 5% for managers and whole-time directors, and 1% for part-time directors. In addition, the
provision gives specific accounting guidelines (in addition to India GAAP) for calculating the net profit that
the pay cap is based on.
35Large listed companies are required to spend at least 2% of net profits for CSR purposes. See Manchiraju
and Rajgopal (2017) for a detailed discussion.
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where FY (k) is an indicator variable for each of the five fiscal year. For example, FY (1)
equals 1 for observations in financial year 2012 (first year in the sample) and otherwise
equals 0; FY (5) equals 1 for observations in financial year 2016 and otherwise equals 0. This
approach allows me to examine whether, conditional on fixed effects and control variables,
the treated firms and the control firms have significant difference in RPT trend prior to
the treatment. As will be discussed later, Figure I shows that the treated group and the
control group follow similar trends prior to the voting rule’s adoption. In addition, as will be
described later, I repeat the main tests based on a sample where treated firms and control
firms are matched on observable characteristics.
5.2. Does Mandatory Voting Affect RPT?
Table III, Panel A, compares pre-treatment RPT variables and firm characteristics be-
tween treated and control firms. As expected, treated firms have much higher RPT volume
than control firms. Total RPT, the ratio of total RPT volume to lagged total assets, is 0.56
for treated firms and 0.21 for control firms. The difference comes entirely from material
RPTs, representing 0.49 of lagged total assets for treated firms, versus 0.14 for control firms.
For both treated and control firms, total RPT are split about equally between operating
RPTs and financing RPTs. In terms of firm characteristics, treated firms are significantly
larger, with average total assets (INR 29.8 billion) around 1.4 times that of the control
firms (INR 21.3 billion). Treated firms also have lower profitability, as measured by ROA,
higher leverage, higher promoter ownership and lower domestic institutional ownership, with
a slightly higher ratio of foreign to domestic institutional ownership.
Panel B reports the changes in average RPT variables from the pre- to the post-treatment
period. Notably, after the voting rule came into effect, the average Total RPT drops sig-
nificantly for the treated group, from 0.56 to 0.45 of lagged total assets, while remaining
almost constant for the control group at 0.21. The reduction of treated group’s Total RPT
is entirely driven by the drop in Material RPT, from 0.49 to 0.37, with both Operating RPT
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and Financing RPT contributing about equally to the drop. Interestingly, treated firms also
experience an increase in total institutional ownership relative to the control firms, driven
by foreign institutional investors.
Table IV reports the result of estimating equation (1) for three outcome variables: Total
RPT, Material RPT and Non-Material RPT. Column 1 and 2 reports the result for Total
RPT. The coefficient on Treated×Post is -0.079 with basic control variables and -0.076 with
additional control variables, significant at 1% level. This suggests that the treated group
experiences an almost 0.08 drop in Total RPT around the voting rule’s adoption, compared
to the control group. The magnitude of the drop is economically significant, approximately
14% of the average Total RPT of the treated group prior to the treatment (0.56).
In Column 3 and 4, I replace the outcome variable with Material RPT. Compared to
the control group, the treated group’s Material RPT decreases by 0.106 with basic control
variables and 0.097 with full controls, significant at 1% level. This result confirms that the
observed drop of Total RPT is entirely driven by Material RPT. Indeed, the treated group
experiences an increase in Non-material RPT relative to the control group (Column 5 and
6). The increase (0.015), though statistically significant, is relatively small compared to
the decrease in Material RPT. This implies that only a small proportion of the reduction
in material transactions is offset by an increase in non-material transactions, alleviating
concerns that treated firms somehow circumvented the rule by replacing material RPTs
with non-material RPTs. Overall, the results from Table IV are consistent with Prediction
1 that the RPT voting rule has a deterrence effect on the level of RPT.
Next, I examine what type of transactions are primarily responsible for the observed
reduction in RPTs. Table V presents the regression result after decomposing Total RPT
into Operating RPT and Financing RPT. Financing RPT are defined as the sum of loans,
investment, purchase and sale of assets, interest payments and dividend payments between
related parties. The remaining RPTs are labeled as Operating RPT, including items such as
sales of good and service, raw material expense, and rent payment. Column 1 and 2 shows
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that Operating RPT witnesses a modest drop for the treated group relative to the control
group, insignificant at 10% level. In contrast, Columns 3 and 4 report that treated firms
have a sharp decrease in Financing RPT compared to the control firms (0.051 with basic
control and 0.040 with additional controls). The magnitude of the DID estimate is about
15-20% of the pre-treatment level (0.26). Consistent with Prediction 2, these results suggest
that the RPT voting rule’s deterrence effect comes primarily from financial transactions.
5.3. Robustness Tests
To provide corroborative evidence for the parallel trend assumption, I estimate the trend
of difference between treated firms and control firms with equation (2). Figure I presents
the results, confirming the results in Table IV and V.36 The trend of the point estimates can
be thought as the difference in RPTs between treated and control group, adjusted for firm
characteristics. The graphs show that both Total RPT and Financing RPT trend similarly
for treated firms and control firms prior to the treatment, and diverge significantly after the
treatment. Operating RPT, however, does not have significant divergence both pre- and
post-treatment, except in financial year 2012, consistent with the result that the effect is less
pronounced for Operating RPT.
Another complication arises when the treated and control firms have different average
levels of outcome variables. In this case, the estimated effect is sensitive to the functional
form of the outcome measurement.37 To address this concern, I use log(1+RPT level) as an
alternative measurement for RPT level, where the unit of RPT level is INR million38. The
result, reported in Table AVII in Internet Appendix, confirms that the results in Table IV
36The estimates are based on the specifications with both basic and additional control variables. The RPT
level in 2014 is set as the reference point.
37For example, assume the interested outcome of a treated firm decreases from 10 to 8, while that of a
control firm decreases from 2 to 1. If the difference is measured in absolute term, the DID estimate will
be -1. If the difference is measured in percentage change, the DID estimate will be 30% (-20%-(-50%)), in
which case even the sign of the estimate changes.
38The change of log(1+RPT level) is a monotonic function of the percentage change of RPT level.
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and V are robust to the functional form of RPT measurement. Panel B shows the results
are robust to using lagged total revenue to scaled RPT variables.
As mentioned earlier, the results are insensitive to using an alternative definition of
control group where I only include firms without any “material” RPTs in pre-treatment
period. The results are reported in Internet Appendix Table AVIII. In addition, Table AIV
confirms that the results are robust to including lagged ROA and ownership characteristics
as control variables.
5.4. Value Implication
The results thus far suggest a deterrence effect of the mandatory voting rule on the
volume of RPTs, especially for financing RPTs. In this section, I investigate whether this
effects results in improved firm value or performance, using two different approaches. First,
I examine how stock prices react to events indicating greater likelihood that the mandatory
voting rule will be passed. Next, I explore how the association between RPT level and firm
performance changes around the rule’s adoption.
5.4.1. Market Response to Mandatory Voting on RPT
My first approach uses short-window stock return to gauge the perceived value effect of the
voting rule. If investors believe the rule will enhance shareholder value, stock prices should
react positively to the news signaling the rule’s passage. Combining the DID framework with
the event study method, I compare the short-window stock returns between treated firms
and control firms around the key legislative events that lead to the passage of the voting
rule.
Following Manchiraju and Rajgopal (2017), I use major milestones in the legislative
history of the Companies Act 2013 to identify key events that signal the passage of the
bill. The Act was first introduced to the Indian parliament on August 2009. After years of
debates and revisions, the Act was approved by Lok Sabha (the lower House of the Indian
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Parliament) on 18th December 2012. The Rajya Sabha (the upper House of the Indian
Parliament) approved the Act on 8th August 2013. On 29th August 2013, the Act received
the President’s assent and became law. Therefore, the first three events I use are the approval
by Lok Sabha, the approval by Rajya Sabha and the President’s assent. The fourth event
I use is the announcement of the SEBI’s rule that includes mandatory voting on RPT into
the exchanges’ listing standard on April 17, 2014.
ERi = β1Treatedi + γXi + i, (3)
where ERi is the three-day excess return, measure as the difference between raw return and
value-weighted return of the data universe accumulated over the three trading days (-1, 0,
+1) around the event. Treatedi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i belongs to the
treatment group. Since the events took place prior to the voting rule’s actual adoption, for
the event study, I classify firms into treated and control groups based on the most recent
three years prior to the events (instead of the adoption). To account for other forces that
may drive the cross-sectional variation in market response, I include the following control
variables (represented by Xi). First, I control total assets (log) and book-to-market ratio,
two variables that could explain variations in cross-sectional returns. Second, I control for
the potential influence of the contemporaneous corporate governance provisions discussed
earlier. Audit Switch (Past 3 Years) is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the firm have
switched external auditor in any of the past three years. If a firm switched auditor from 2011
to 2013, it is less effected by the rule when it comes into effect in 2017, because firms are
only required to change auditor once every 10 years. To account for the provisions on board
composition and executive pay, I include board independence and the natural logarithm of
CEO total pay, measured before the events. Lastly, I control for CSR Coverage, a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm is expected to be affected by the mandatory CSR expenditure
rule.39 The above specification can be interpreted as a difference-in-difference design around
39The applicability of the rule depends on whether the firm passes certain thresholds on revenue (INR 10
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the events, since the cumulative excess return can be interpreted as the change in shareholder
value.
Although in theory each event could raise the perceived probability of mandatory RPT
voting, the impact of each individual event may not be equally significant. To increase the
power of the test, I also compound the cumulative returns across the four events (12 trading
days) and use the 4-event-cumulative excess return as the outcome variable. To make the
results comparable across different events, I only include firms that have data for all four
events, resulting in 1,212 unique firms.
Table VI reports the results from the event study. Columns 1–4 report the differential
market reactions of the treated and control groups to each of the four events. The coefficient
for Treated is positive and significant for the first two events, which correspond to the
passage of the Companies Act 2013 in the lower and upper House of the Indian Parliament.
For event 3 and 4, the coefficients are positive but not statistically significant. One possibility
is that the later events did not provide new information to the market following the bill’s
passage in the Parliament. In Column 5, I aggregate the four events by using the excess
return accumulated over the 4 events (12 trading days). The coefficient of Treated is 0.038,
suggesting that treated firms on average experience a 3.8% higher return than control firms
over the 12 trading days when the probability of adopting the RPT voting rule increased
significantly. The results are consistent with the prediction that shareholders on average
expected mandatory voting on RPT voting to have a positive impact on shareholder value.
5.4.2. Change in the Association between RPT and Firm Profitability
The analysis on market response provides evidence that investors expect that the RPT
voting rule will raise shareholder value. However, that approach does not address whether
and how the voting rule contributes to shareholder value ex post. To fill this gap, I study how
billion), profit (INR 50 million), or net worth (INR 5 billion). If a firm met one of the thresholds given its
most recent financial information before the events, I set CSR coverage to 1.
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mandatory voting on RPT contributes to firm profitability, measured by return on assets. As
stated in Prediction 4, if the voting mechanism successfully filters out expropriation, I expect
the association between RPT and firm performance to increase after the rule’s adoption. To
test this prediction, I modify the baseline DID equation as follows
ROAit = β1RPTit + β2RPTit × Treatedi + β3RPTit × Postt + β4RPTit × Treatedi × Postt
+ β5Treatedi × Postt + γXit + ηt + δi + it,
(4)
where ROAit is the outcome of interest for firm i in year t. RPTit is the RPT variable of
interest. Other variables follows Equation (1) with detailed definition presented in Appendix
A.
Table VII reports the results. In Column 1 and 2, I explore the association between Total
RPT and ROA. In next two columns and the last two columns, I swap the RPT variable
with Operating RPT and Financing RPT, respectively. Across the six columns, the first
row shows that the coefficients of RPTs variables are positive in five specifications but only
statistically significant in two of them, suggesting a weakly positive association between
RPT and firm performance prior to the treatment. The main interest is the coefficient
of the triple interactions term, RPT × Treated × Post, which measures how much the
association between RPT and profitability changes around the treatment for the treated
group relative to the control group. Column 1 shows the coefficient of the triple interaction
is positive and significant at 5% level, implying that association between Total RPT and
ROA increased by 0.028 in the treated firms compared to the control firms. Column 2 shows
similar results with additional control variables. Column 3 and 4 report that the coefficient
is not significant when Operating RPT is used as the RPT variable. Column 5 and 6,
however, show that the association between Financing RPT and ROA increases significantly
in the treated firms relative to the control firms (by 0.064 and 0.080), even when additional
controls are included. Overall, these findings suggest that, after the voting rule’s adoption,
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RPTs, especially financial transactions, have on average a more positive contribution to the
firm profitability. This is consistent with the conjecture that mandatory voting on RPT, on
average, filtered out value-destroying RPTs while preserving value-creating RPTs.
5.5. Institutional Ownership
The last part of my main results focuses on how the voting rule affect institutional
ownership. I use the baseline DID regression outlined in equation (1) to examine how
institutional ownership changes for the treated firms relative to the control firms around the
adoption of the RPT voting rule. Table VIII presents the results. Column 1 shows that,
compared to the control group, the treated group’s total institutional ownership increases
by 0.014, approximately 9.1% of the pre-treatment level of 0.15. In Column 3 and 5, I
break down the total institutional ownership to the domestic component and the foreign
component. The coefficients is positive for both outcome variables, but only significant
for foreign institutional holdings, suggesting that the observed effect on total institutional
holdings is primarily driven by foreign institutions. The increase in foreign institutional
holdings (0.008) represents a 21% percentage change from the pre-treatment level of 0.039.
Columns 2, 4 and 6 confirm the findings with additional control variables. The results
in Table VIII are consistent with the prediction that the RPT voting rule make firms with
material RPTs more attractive to institutional investors, especially foreign ones, presumably
because of reduced expropriation risk under the new regime.
5.6. Additional Tests
5.6.1. Propensity Score Matching and Entropy Balancing
To further alleviate the concern that my results are driven by pre-treatment differences
in firm characteristics between treated and control firms, I match a subset of control firms
to the treated firms with similar characteristics. Specifically, I use the propensity score
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matching (PSM) based on the following characteristics measured in each pf the three pre-
treatment year: total assets (log), leverage, ROA, excess returns, and promoter ownership
(i.e. 15 covariates in total). I perform a one-to-one nearest-neighborhood PSM matching
without replacement. The matching procedure leaves 351 treated firms and the same number
of control firms. The balance of the matched sample’s average firm characteristics prior to
the treatment is presented in Table AIX Panel A in Internet Appendix. I then estimate
the DID regressions based on the matched sample. The results are reported in Table AX.
Across various outcome variables, the results are comparable to the full-sample analysis,
suggesting that observable pre-treatment differences between treated firms and control firms
do not drive the main results. As an sensitivity check, I perform the nearest-neighborhood
matching on the Mahalanobis distance of the covariates (instead of the propensity score)
and obtain similar results.
As an alternative to matching, I use the entropy balancing technique (Hainmueller (2012))
that reweighs observations to achieve weighted covariate balance. Compared to PSM, en-
tropy balancing directly targets covariate balance (in mean and higher moments) and assigns
continuous weights to units. I base the entropy weighting on the mean and variance of the
same 15 covariates as in PSM. The comparison of reweighed means are reported in Table AIX
Panel B. Table AXI confirms that the weighted regression results are qualitatively similar
to the main analyses and PSM.
5.6.2. Placebo Test
To provide more support for parallel trend assumption, I perform placebo tests where
I estimate the DID regression with a pseudo-treatment event date. The idea is that if the
treated firms and control firms would have similar trends in outcome variables in the absence
of the treatment, a placebo test with a pseudo-treatment event date should give null results.
A challenge for my setting is that firms may react to the voting rule prior to the rule’s
adoption. Although the voting rule was passed in 2013 and implemented in 2014, it was
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first introduced to the Parliament in 2009. It is possible that from 2009 to 2014 some firms
gradually react to the rule in anticipation of its passage.40 Furthermore, the revelation of the
Satyam Scandal in 2009 may in itself pressure firms to adopt better corporate governance
practices. Therefore, I use the window from financial year 2004 to 2008 for the placebo
test, with 2007 and 2008 labelled “post”.41 Following the original design, I group firms into
“treated” or “control” based on their RPT level in 2004, 2005 and 2006. As can be seen in
Table AXII, I do not find significant difference in the change of the key outcome variables
between the “treated” group and the “control” group.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I use the Indian’s mandatory RPT voting rule to shed light on how to
mitigate the expropriation of minority shareholders in the presence of business groups with
concentrated control rights. My evidence shows that RPT resolutions receive significant
higher shareholders dissent compared to other resolutions, which is explained by both the
“majority-of-minority” feature of the rule and that shareholder cast against votes more
frequently. This implies that the expropriation through RPTs is indeed a primary concern
of minority shareholders, and that shareholder voting enables minority shareholders to make
a meaningful impact on addressing this concern. Using a difference-in-difference design for
identification, I show that the voting rule has a deterrence effect on the level of RPTs,
especially on financial transactions. The drop in RPTs for the treated firms (relative to the
control firms) is accompanied by an increase in shareholder value and higher institutional
holdings.
My results have implication to policy makers and practitioners who interested in pro-
40The potential preemptive reaction may introduce attenuation bias to the original DID design. However,
this concern does not invalidate the qualitative result if the null hypothesis of no effect is rejected.
41Since the 2008 financial year ends in March 2008, the potential impact of the financial crisis should be
minimal. In March 2008, the level of S&P 500 index and its Indian equivalent, S&P BSE 500 index, were
comparable to their 2013 levels.
38
tecting minority shareholders from expropriation. Anecdotes and academic research show
that related party transactions can help business groups overcome market frictions, but can
also be used to expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth. My paper shows that mandatory
shareholder voting can serve as a filter to curb the expropriation element from transactions
that serve legitimate business purposes. However, to make the voting rule “bite”, the voting
rights should be primarily given to the minority shareholders, especially in companies where
control rights are concentrated. Alleviating the concern of expropriation have a positive















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Determinants of Voting Outcomes and Proxy Recommendations
Outcome Variable Against Percent D(Against>25%) D(Against Recommendation)
Regression Model Linear Logit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Past Total RPT 0.109* 2.385** -0.137
(1.89) (2.55) (-0.19)
Past Operating RPT 0.066 0.100 0.901 1.966 -1.405
(0.83) (1.37) (0.57) (1.38) (-1.41)
Past Financing RPT 0.283** 0.201* 6.965** 6.264** 2.855*
(2.31) (1.87) (2.23) (2.12) (1.82)
Against Recommendation 0.139*** 1.897***
(4.84) (3.33)
log(Total Assets) 0.002 0.002 0.008 -0.281 -0.295 -0.210 -0.205 -0.201*
(0.11) (0.14) (0.61) (-0.95) (-0.96) (-0.69) (-1.60) (-1.68)
Past ROA -0.344** -0.353** -0.266** -5.521*** -6.368*** -5.540** -2.828* -3.175*
(-2.23) (-2.27) (-2.44) (-3.22) (-3.31) (-2.37) (-1.72) (-1.91)
Past Excess Return -0.010 -0.006 -0.004 -0.212 -0.017 -0.160 -0.164 -0.067
(-0.53) (-0.30) (-0.27) (-0.60) (-0.04) (-0.35) (-0.52) (-0.22)
Promoter Ownership 0.061 0.047 0.026 2.798* 2.518 2.647 1.352* 1.050
(1.01) (0.74) (0.43) (1.87) (1.45) (1.39) (1.64) (1.32)
Domestic Inst. Ownership -0.028 0.041 -0.013 -0.011 3.196 2.287 0.967 2.375
(-0.21) (0.28) (-0.09) (0.00) (0.81) (0.52) (0.50) (1.15)
Foreign Inst. Ownership 0.368** 0.385** 0.270* 10.042*** 11.702** 10.253** 3.931** 4.286**
(2.04) (2.09) (1.69) (3.04) (2.52) (2.20) (2.21) (2.23)
# of Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.138 0.155 0.259 0.225 0.283 0.362 0.060 0.089
This table reports the result from regressions exploring the cross-sectional determinants of RPT resolutions’ voting outcomes. The sample
contains 288 RPT resolutions in financial year 2015 and 2016. The sample size is smaller than Table I Panel A because the current table only
contains observations that are linked from the voting data to Prowess with full information on the reported variables. The dependent variable
for column 1, 2, 3 is the percent of “against” votes of votes cast received by the resolution. The dependent variable for column 4, 5 and 6 is an
indicator denoting that the resolution receives above 25% against votes. The dependent variable for column 7 and 8 is an indicator denoting an
“against” recommendation by the Institutional Shareholder Services. The regression model column 1-3 is a linear model with OLS estimation,
whereas the model for column 4-8 is a logit model with maximum-likelihood estimation. Past Total RPT, Past Operating RPT and Past Financing
RPT are the one-year lagged total RPT, operating RPT and financing RPT level divided by total assets, respectively. Past ROA and Past Excess
Return are the one-year lagged accounting return on assets and excess stock return (raw return minus market return), respectively. Variable
definitions are detailed in Appendix A. Standard errors in all models are clustered at firm level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote statistically different from zero at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level in two-tailed t tests, respectively.
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Table III
Summary Statistics for the Difference-in-Difference Sample
Panel A: Pre-Treatment Firm Characteristics
Variable Name Treated Control Difference
N. Firm-Years Mean N. Firm-Years Mean in Mean
Total RPT/Total Assets 1,080 0.556 3,629 0.212 0.344***
Material RPT/Total Assets 1,080 0.486 3,629 0.138 0.348***
Non-material RPT/Total Assets 1,080 0.070 3,629 0.074 -0.005
Operating RPT/Total Assets 1,080 0.296 3,629 0.107 0.190***
Financing RPT/Total Assets 1,080 0.260 3,629 0.106 0.154***
Number of Related Parties 1,080 8.686 3,629 6.796 1.890***
Number of “Material” Related Parties 1,080 1.754 3,629 0.425 1.329***
Total Assets (Million INR) 1,080 29,816 3,629 21,253 8,563*
Total Assets (log) 1,080 7.734 3,629 7.546 0.188**
ROA 1,080 0.024 3,629 0.030 -0.006*
Past Excess Return 1,080 -0.010 3,629 -0.019 0.009
leverage 1,080 0.339 3,629 0.303 0.037***
Promoter ownership 1,065 0.542 3,584 0.512 0.029***
Total Institutional Ownership 1,065 0.154 3,584 0.160 -0.006
Domestic Institutional Ownership 1,065 0.115 3,584 0.125 -0.010***
Foreign Institutional Ownership 1,065 0.039 3,584 0.035 0.005*
Panel B: Change in Outcome Variables From Pre- to Post-Treatement Period
Variable Name Treated Control Univariate
Pre Post Pre Post DID
Total RPT/Total Assets 0.556 0.445 0.212 0.207 -0.116
Material RPT/Total Assets 0.486 0.371 0.138 0.143 -0.110
Non-material RPT/Total Assets 0.070 0.074 0.074 0.064 -0.006
Operating RPT/Total Assets 0.296 0.242 0.107 0.099 -0.061
Financing RPT/Total Assets 0.260 0.204 0.106 0.108 -0.054
Total Institutional Ownership 0.154 0.165 0.160 0.155 0.006
Domestic Institutional Ownership 0.115 0.113 0.126 0.119 -0.009
Foreign Institutional Ownership 0.039 0.052 0.035 0.036 0.014
Panel A reports the mean firm characteristics for the treated group and the control group. *, **, and *** denote
the mean between treated and control are statistically different from zero at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level in
two-tailed t tests, respectively. Panel B presents the mean outcome variables for treated and control groups, before
and after the adoption of the RPT voting rule. The column “Univariate DID” reports the result of [(column 2 -
column 1) - (column 4 - column 3)]. Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix A.
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Table IV
The Effect of RPT Voting on RPT level: Baseline Regression Results
Outcome Variable Total RPT Material RPT Non-material RPT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated×Post -0.079*** -0.076*** -0.106*** -0.097*** 0.015*** 0.013**
(-3.39) (-3.13) (-4.74) (-4.14) (3.11) (2.40)
Log(Total Assets) 0.011 0.078** 0.023 0.078* 0.004 0.007
(0.23) (1.96) (0.53) (1.84) (0.99) (1.24)
Leverage 0.202*** 0.192** 0.211*** 0.223** -0.025*** -0.029**
(2.81) (1.97) (3.09) (2.35) (-3.31) (-2.20)
Past Excess Return 0.013* 0.012* 0.008 0.007 0.004** 0.004**
(1.74) (1.91) (1.34) (1.16) (2.53) (2.26)
Auditor Switch 0.021 0.000 0.008
(1.38) (0.04) (1.61)
Log(CEO Pay) 0.003 0.002 0.004***
(0.55) (0.41) (2.59)
Pct. New Director 0.112*** 0.090** 0.015
(2.74) (2.39) (1.56)
Board Independence -0.051 -0.055 -0.013
(-1.00) (-1.14) (-0.96)
Audit. Com. Independence -0.003 -0.007 0.004
(-0.09) (-0.20) (0.37)
CSR Expenditure 0.727 -11.992* 7.397***
(0.11) (-1.89) (2.71)
Number of Observations 7,743 5,921 7,743 5,921 7,743 5,921
Number of Firms 1,716 1,583 1,716 1,583 1,716 1,583
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.567 0.676 0.540 0.646 0.518 0.560
This table reports the results from the difference-in-difference regressions relating the mandatory RPT voting rule to firms’
RPT levels. The dependent variable is Total RPT for column 1 and 2, Material RPT for column 3 and 4, and Non-material
RPT for column 5 and 6. In column 1, 3 and 5, the full sample is used for estimation; in column 2, 4 and 6, the subsample
with additional control variables is used. Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix A. All specifications include firm
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** denote statistically different from zero at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level in two-tailed t tests, respectively.
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Table V
The Effect of RPT Voting on RPT level: Operating vs. Financing
Outcome Variable Operating RPT Financing RPT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated×Post -0.022 -0.020 -0.051*** -0.040***
(-1.64) (-1.48) (-3.77) (-2.75)
Number of Observations 7,743 5,921 7,743 5,921
Number of Firms 1,716 1,583 1,716 1,583
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.629 0.756 0.529 0.564
This table reports the results from the difference-in-difference regressions relating the
mandatory RPT voting rule to Operating RPT and FInancing RPT. The dependent
variable is Operating RPT for column 1 and 2 and Financing RPT for column 3 and 4.
In column 1 and 3, the full sample is used for estimation; in column 2 and 4 the subsample
with additional control variables is used. Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix
A. All specifications include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by firm. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote




Market Response to Events Related to the RPT Voting Rule
Outcome Variable: Three Day Cumulative Excess Return (-1, 0, +1)
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated 0.010** 0.019*** 0.004 0.003 0.038***
(2.23) (2.89) (0.92) (0.69) (3.38)
Log(Total Assets) 0.001 0.007*** 0.001 -0.001 0.009***
(1.16) (4.92) (0.85) (-0.64) (3.29)
Book-to-Market 0.000 0.002 -0.004*** 0.000 -0.002
(0.49) (1.56) (-4.11) (-0.12) (-0.77)
Audit Switch (Past 3 years) 0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.001
(1.33) (-0.78) (-0.67) (0.61) (-0.08)
Log(CEO pay) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.71) (0.42) (0.25) (0.79) (0.37)
Board Independence 0.011 -0.001 0.003 0.013 0.030
(0.72) (-0.07) (0.24) (0.91) (0.81)
CSR Coverage 0.003 0.004 -0.007 0.004 0.005
(0.73) (0.64) (-1.42) (0.74) (0.40)
Number of firms 1,212 1,212 1,212 1,212 1,212
Adj. R-squared 0.010 0.049 0.019 0.003 0.032
This table reports the results of estimating the stock market response to the events that signals the passage
of the RPT voting rule. From column 1 to 4, the dependent variable is 3 day cumulative excess return.
In column 5, the outcome variable is the cumulative excess return from all 4 events (i.e. 12 event days).
Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix A. Standard errors are Huber-White robust standard errors.
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically different from zero at 10%, 5%,
and 1% significance level in two-tailed t tests, respectively.
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Table VII
The Effect of RPT Voting on the Association Between RPT and Profitability
Outcome Variable: Return on Assets
RPT=Total RPT RPT=Operating RPT RPT=Financing RPT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RPT 0.006 0.018* 0.004 0.012 0.014* 0.029
(0.69) (1.77) (0.28) (1.14) (1.88) (1.42)
RPT×Treated 0.011 0.001 0.013 0.000 -0.009 -0.027
(0.68) (0.07) (0.43) (-0.02) (-0.67) (-1.18)
RPT×Post -0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.015 -0.008 -0.016
(-0.58) (-1.14) (-0.42) (-1.41) (-0.54) (-0.78)
RPT×Treated×Post 0.029** 0.027* 0.018 0.018 0.064*** 0.080**
(2.04) (1.91) (1.05) (1.20) (2.74) (2.42)
Treated×Post -0.009 -0.006 -0.003 0.000 -0.010* -0.010*
(-1.43) (-1.03) (-0.43) (-0.02) (-1.88) (-1.70)
Number of Observations 7,743 5,921 7,743 5,921 7,743 5,921
Number of Firms 1,716 1,583 1,716 1,583 1,716 1,583
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.559 0.633 0.557 0.631 0.560 0.634
This table reports the results from the difference-in-difference regressions relating the mandatory RPT voting rule
to the association between RPT and firm profitability. The dependent variable is Return on Assets (ROA) for all
columns. The independent variable RPT is Total RPT for column 1 and 2, Operating RPT for column 3 and 4,
and Financing RPT for column 5 and 6. In column 1, 3 and 5, the full sample is used for estimation; in column 2,
4 and 6, the subsample with additional control variables is used. Variable definitions are detailed in Appendix A.
All specifications include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically different from zero at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance
level in two-tailed t tests, respectively.
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Table VIII
The Effect of RPT Voting on Institutional Ownership
Outcome Variable Total Inst. Ownership Domestic Inst. Ownership Foreign Inst. Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated×Post 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.005 0.002 0.008*** 0.010***
(3.31) (2.59) (1.49) (0.54) (3.57) (3.80)
Log(Total Assets) 0.029*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.017***
(4.99) (3.72) (2.86) (0.27) (6.40) (5.95)
Leverage -0.011 -0.015* -0.003 0.000 -0.009*** -0.015***
(-1.55) (-1.65) (-0.40) (-0.05) (-2.70) (-2.59)
Past Excess Return 0.003** 0.004** 0.000 0.001 0.003*** 0.003***
(2.36) (2.48) (0.19) (0.60) (4.37) (3.33)
Auditor Switch 0.006* 0.003 0.003*
(1.72) (0.81) (1.76)
Log(CEO Pay) 0.002 0.000 0.002**
(1.43) (0.04) (2.23)
Pct. New Director -0.009 -0.001 -0.007*
(-1.16) (-0.20) (-1.95)
Board Independence -0.007 -0.005 -0.002
(-0.52) (-0.40) (-0.30)
Auditing Com. Independence 0.006 0.011 -0.005
(0.64) (1.32) (-1.06)
CSR Expenditure 7.152*** 1.729 5.423***
(4.04) (1.03) (4.55)
# of Observations 7,655 5,896 7,655 5,896 7,655 5,896
# of Firms 1,716 1,578 1,716 1,578 1,716 1,578
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.841 0.852 0.771 0.773 0.878 0.887
This table reports the results from the difference-in-difference regressions relating the mandatory RPT voting rule to institutional
ownership. The dependent variable is total institutional ownership for column 1 and 2, domestic institutional ownership for
column 3 and 4, and foreign institutional ownership for column 5 and 6. In column 1, 3 and 5, the full sample is used for
estimation; in column 2, 4 and 6, the subsample with additional control variables is used. Variable definitions are detailed in
Appendix A. All specifications include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically different from zero at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level in
two-tailed t tests, respectively.
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Figure I. Differential Trends of RPTs around Voting Rule
This figure plots the difference-in-difference estimates for the effect of RPT voting on RPT
levels, where the point estimate is allowed to vary by year. The solid points indicate point-
estimate, and the dashed lines represent 95% confidence interval. Financial year 2014, the
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
RPT Variables
Total RPT: The sum of all related party transactions (excluding director/manager compensation)
with all related parties carried out during the financial year, divided by lagged total assets. The
specific types of transactions included are described in the definitions of Operating RPT and Fi-
nancing RPT, which are the two components of Total RPT.
Operating RPT: The sum of operating related party transactions (excluding director/manager
compensation) with all related parties carried out during the financial year, divided by lagged total
assets. The following items are labeled as operating: income from sale of goods and services, rent
income, other operating income, payment for raw material and finished goods, energy expense,
marketing expense, processing expense, rent expense, royalty expense, reimbursement of expenses
to/by related parties, other operating expenses, other transactions.
Financing RPT: The sum of financing related party transactions with all related parties carried
out during the financial year, divided by lagged total assets. The following items are labeled as
financing: loans and guarantees given during the year, loans and guarantees taken during the year,
purchase/sale of fixed assets, purchase/sale of investments, capital issued during the year, interest
payment, interest income, dividend payment, dividend income.
Material RPT: The sum of all related party transactions (excluding director/manager compen-
sation) with the “material” related parties carried out during the financial year, divided by lagged
total assets. For firm i in financial year t, a related party of firm i is classified as “material” if
firm i’s total transaction amount with the party during year t exceeds 10% of firm i’s most recent
consolidated revenue. If firm i does not have a “material” related party during financial year t,
Material RPT equals 0.
Non-material RPT: Total RPT minus material RPT.
Equity Ownership Variables
Promotor Ownership: The percentage of shares held by individuals and entities classified as
promoters. A company’s promoter(s) is legally defined as an individual or entity that control the
company. One company can have multiple promoters.
Total Institutional Ownership: The percentage of shares held by all non-promoter institutional
investors, including mutual funds, banks, financial institutions, insurance companies, venture cap-
itals, central and state governments, and foreign institutions.
Domestic Institutional Ownership: The percentage of shares held by non-promoter Indian
institutional investors.
Foreign Institutional Ownership: The percentage of shares held by non-promoter foreign in-
stitutional investors.
Shareholder Voting Variables
Against Votes (%): The number of against votes received by a resolution divided by the total
number of votes cast on the resolution.
D(Against>25% (50%)): A dummy variable that equals one if the number of against votes
received by a resolution is greater than 25% (50%) of the votes cast on the resolution.
Against Recommendation: A dummy variable that equals one if ISS recommend “against” on
a resolution.
Votes Cast/Shares Outstanding: The number of votes cast on a resolution divided by the
number of shares outstanding.
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Other Firm Characteristics
Log(Total Assets): The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in millions of INR.
Leverage: Total borrowings divided by total assets.
Return on Assets (ROA): Total profits before tax divided by lagged total assets. “Past ROA”
represents one-year lagged ROA.
Excess Return: Raw return minus the valued weighted average return of the Prowess stock return
universe. In the event study, Excess Return is measured at trading day level. In voting regression
and DID regressions, Excess Return is measured at annual level. “Past Excess Return” is one-year
lagged annual Excess Return.
Audit Switch: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm switches auditor in the year and 0
otherwise.
Audit Switch (Past 3 Years): A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has switched auditor
in the past 3 years prior to the event and 0 otherwise.
Log(CEO pay): The natural logarithm of CEO (or top manager)’s total pay. If a CEO (or top
manager) cannot be identified, the total pay of the highest paid director or manager is used.
Percentage of New Directors: The number of newly appointed directors in the year divided by
the number of directors on board.
Board Independence: The number of independent directors divided by the total number of direc-
tors. Director independence is classified by CMIE (the data vendor) based on company disclosures
and CMIE’s own information.
Audit Committee Independence: The number of independent directors on the audit commit-
tee divided by the number of audit committee members.
CSR Expenditure: CSR expenditure divided by lagged total assets.
CSR Coverage: A dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the firm is affected under the manda-
tory CSR expensing provision of the 2013 Act.
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Appendix B: Research Design Illustration
The first example illustrates how material RPT are calculated for firm A and B for
financial year t. Each firm has three related parties and three possible types of transactions.
The unit of currency is INR million. Both firms have revenue INR 100 million in the past
financial year. If the sum of transactions with a party during the current year exceeds 10%
of lagged revenue (i.e. the threshold prescribed by SEBI), all transactions with the party
are classified as material.
The second example illustrates how firm X, Y and Z are classified into treated and control
groups given their material RPTs from financial year 2012 to 2014.
3 Types of Transactions RPT for RPT/Past Total Material
Related Party Type A Type B Type C Each Party Revenue Material? RPT RPT
Firm A Party No. 1 8 5 2 15 15% Yes
(Past Revenue Party No. 2 0 5 0 5 5% No 25 15
=100) Party No. 3 3 0 2 5 5% No
Firm B Party No. 1 0 7 0 7 7% No
(Past Revenue Party No. 2 0 5 2 7 7% No 20 0
=100) Party No. 3 3 0 3 6 6% No
Pre-Treatment “Material” RPT>0?
2012 2013 2014 Classification
Firm X Yes Yes Yes Treated
Firm Y Yes No No Control





Industry Control Treated Total RPT
Number of Firms Percentage Number of Firms Percentage (Full Sample)
Agriculture 26 1.9% 0 0.0% 0.280
Communication 68 5.0% 46 12.8% 0.312
Construction 67 4.9% 30 8.3% 0.271
Entertainment 7 0.5% 4 1.1% 0.359
Finance 174 12.8% 70 19.4% 0.330
Health 10 0.7% 3 0.8% 0.289
Hotel & Food Service 20 1.5% 9 2.5% 0.172
Manufacturing 711 52.4% 124 34.4% 0.244
Mining 15 1.1% 4 1.1% 0.140
Other 42 3.1% 9 2.5% 0.213
Real Estate 15 1.1% 6 1.7% 0.261
Retail 145 10.7% 31 8.6% 0.381
Business Service 40 2.9% 7 1.9% 0.400
Transportation 9 0.7% 10 2.8% 0.207















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Consequences to Shareholder Dissent
Total RPT
















Robustness: Controlling for Past ROA and Ownership
Outcome Variable Total RPT Operating RPT Financing RPT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated×Post -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.017 -0.019 -0.048*** -0.039***
(-3.06) (-3.13) (-1.32) (-1.39) (-3.53) (-2.75)
Log(Total Assets) 0.085** 0.094** -0.009 -0.011 0.072*** 0.080***
(2.09) (2.23) (-0.44) (-0.65) (3.68) (3.84)
Leverage 0.209*** 0.184* -0.040 -0.015 0.175*** 0.122**
(2.79) (1.79) (-1.36) (-0.45) (4.27) (2.45)
Past ROA 0.064 0.027 0.030 -0.001 0.040 0.029
(0.68) (0.32) (0.77) (-0.03) (0.69) (0.65)
Promoter Ownership -0.217 -0.134 -0.137 -0.082 -0.046 0.003
(-1.21) (-0.99) (-1.50) (-1.27) (-0.55) (0.04)
Domestic Inst. Ownership -0.081 -0.119 -0.096 -0.087 -0.012 -0.007
(-0.51) (-1.01) (-1.40) (-1.42) (-0.14) (-0.11)
Foregin Inst. Ownership 0.109 0.087 0.132* 0.163** -0.007 -0.061
(0.78) (0.66) (1.74) (2.04) (-0.07) (-0.75)
Past Excess Return 0.008 0.012* 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.006*
(1.08) (1.80) (0.90) (0.62) (0.89) (1.79)
Auditor Switch 0.018 0.005 0.010
(1.21) (0.46) (0.95)
Log(CEO Pay) 0.004 0.000 0.002
(0.86) (0.08) (0.63)
Pct. New Director 0.107** 0.035 0.045**
(2.55) (1.54) (2.03)
Board Independence -0.050 -0.034 -0.033
(-0.93) (-1.09) (-1.01)
Audit. Com. Independence -0.013 0.014 -0.003
(-0.36) (0.64) (-0.14)
CSR Expenditure -2.275 -5.299 2.640
(-0.36) (-0.95) (0.63)
Number of Observations 7574 5839 7574 5839 7574 5839
Number of Firms 1716 1577 1716 1577 1716 1577
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table AV
Robustness: Controlling for Average RPT-to-Revenue (Pre) Interacting with Post
Outcome Variable Total RPT Operating RPT Financing RPT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated×Post -0.054** -0.054** -0.015 -0.020 -0.035*** -0.025*
(-2.38) (-2.37) (-1.01) (-1.48) (-2.76) (-1.87)
RPT/Revenue Pre×Post -0.011*** -0.011** -0.003* 0.000 -0.007*** -0.007*
(-3.91) (-2.07) (-1.90) (0.45) (-3.89) (-1.91)
Number of Observations 7743 5921 7743 5921 7743 5921
Number of Firms 1716 1583 1716 1583 1716 1583
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table AVI
Robustness: Excluding Firms with Potentially Treated Parties
Outcome Variable Total RPT Operating RPT Financing RPT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated* Post -0.077*** -0.069*** -0.016 -0.010 -0.055*** -0.042***
(-2.99) (-2.65) (-1.07) (-0.68) (-3.68) (-2.69)
Number of Observations 6869 5233 6869 5233 6869 5233
Number of Firms 1527 1407 1527 1407 1527 1407
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table AVII
Robustness: Alternative Measurement of RPT Variables
Panel A
Outcome Variable Log(1+Total RPT) Log(1+Operating RPT) Log(1+Financing RPT)
(1) (3) (5)
Treated×Post -0.194*** -0.039 -0.209**
(-3.02) (-0.55) (-2.37)
Number of Observations 7743 7743 7743
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No No No
Panel B
Outcome Variable Total RPT/Sales Operating RPT/Sales Financing RPT/Sales
(2) (4) (6)
Treated×Post -0.305* -0.049** -0.254**
(-1.95) (-2.46) (-2.03)
Number of Observations 7743 7743 7743
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No No No
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Table AVIII
Robustness: Alternative Control Group Definition
Outcome Variable Total RPT Operating RPT Financing RPT
(1) (2) (3)
Treated×Post -0.112*** -0.041*** -0.064***
(-4.92) (-3.13) (-4.91)
Number of Observations 4762 4762 4762
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No No No
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Table AIX
Pre-Treatment Characteristics: Matching and Entropy Balancing
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching Covariate Balance
Treated Control
Variable Name Number of Firms Mean Number of Firms Mean
Total Assets (log), 2012 351 7.658 351 7.726
Total Assets (log), 2013 351 7.721 351 7.791
Total Assets (log), 2014 351 7.784 351 7.842
leverage, 2012 351 0.329 351 0.329
leverage, 2013 351 0.336 351 0.333
leverage, 2014 351 0.351 351 0.347
Past Excess Return, 2012 351 -0.041 351 -0.016
Past Excess Return, 2013 351 -0.017 351 -0.005
Past Excess Return, 2014 351 -0.013 351 -0.022
ROA, 2012 351 0.026 351 0.030
ROA, 2013 351 0.027 351 0.029
ROA, 2014 351 0.023 351 0.028
Promoter ownership, 2012 351 0.542 351 0.548
Promoter ownership, 2013 351 0.542 351 0.549
Promoter ownership, 2014 351 0.541 351 0.547
Panel B: Entropy Balancing Covariate Balance
Treated Control
Variable Name Number of Firms Weighted Mean Number of Firms Weighted Mean
Total Assets (log), 2012 351 7.658 972 7.658
Total Assets (log), 2013 351 7.721 972 7.721
Total Assets (log), 2014 351 7.784 972 7.784
leverage, 2012 351 0.329 972 0.329
leverage, 2013 351 0.336 972 0.336
leverage, 2014 351 0.351 972 0.351
Past Excess Return, 2012 351 -0.041 972 -0.041
Past Excess Return, 2013 351 -0.017 972 -0.017
Past Excess Return, 2014 351 -0.013 972 -0.013
ROA, 2012 351 0.026 972 0.026
ROA, 2013 351 0.027 972 0.027
ROA, 2014 351 0.023 972 0.023
Promoter ownership, 2012 351 0.542 972 0.542
Promoter ownership, 2013 351 0.542 972 0.542
Promoter ownership, 2014 351 0.541 972 0.541
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Table AX
Difference-in-Difference Estimation with Matched Sample
Panel A: RPT level
Outcome Variable Total RPT Operating RPT Financing RPT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated* Post -0.108*** -0.091*** -0.032** -0.031** -0.062*** -0.043***
(-4.11) (-3.69) (-2.23) (-2.13) (-4.19) (-2.95)
Number of Observations 3348 2647 3348 2647 3348 2647
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel B: RPT and Profitability
Outcome Variable: Return on Assets
RPT=Total RPT RPT=Operating RPT RPT=Financing RPT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RPT*Treated*Post 0.023 0.027* -0.010 0.007 0.063** 0.083***
(1.12) (1.67) (-0.45) (0.32) (2.06) (2.67)
Number of Observations 3348 2647 3348 2647 3348 2647
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel C: institutional Holding
Outcome Variable Total Inst. Ownership Domestic Inst. Ownership Foreign Inst. Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated* Post 0.010** 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.005* 0.007**
(2.02) (1.39) (1.14) (0.19) (1.71) (2.05)
Number of Observations 3342 2644 3342 2644 3342 2644
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table AXI
Difference-in-Difference Estimation with Entropy Balancing
Panel A: RPT level
Outcome Variable Total RPT Operating RPT Financing RPT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated* Post -0.121*** -0.104*** -0.028** -0.024* -0.072*** -0.054***
(-3.87) (-3.89) (-2.07) (-1.79) (-4.27) (-3.40)
Number of Observations 6320 5093 6320 5093 6320 5093
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel B: RPT and Profitability
Outcome Variable: Return on Assets
RPT=Total RPT RPT=Operating RPT RPT=Financing RPT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RPT*Treated*Post 0.023 0.027* -0.010 0.007 0.063** 0.083***
(1.12) (1.67) (-0.45) (0.32) (2.06) (2.67)
Number of Observations 6320 5093 6320 5093 6320 5093
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel C: institutional Holding
Outcome Variable Total Inst. Ownership Domestic Inst. Ownership Foreign Inst. Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated* Post 0.007 0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.005** 0.007**
(1.61) (0.86) (0.60) (-0.60) (2.01) (2.44)
Number of Observations 6312 5089 6312 5089 6312 5089
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Outcome Variable Total RPT Operating RPT Financing RPT Total Inst. Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated×Post 0.010 -0.021 0.018 0.004
(0.21) (-0.58) (0.96) (0.36)
Number of Observations 5398 5398 5398 5193
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No No No No
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Table AXIII
Probability of Positive Interest Income or Expense
Outcome Variable D(Interest Income) D(Interest Expense)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated×Post 0.050* 0.064* -0.037 -0.054
(1.69) (1.82) (-1.12) (-1.32)
Number of Observations 3299 2683 2382 1757
Fixed Effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Basic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Control No Yes No Yes
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Appendix A1: Examples of Related Party Transaction Resolution
and Accounting Disclosure
United Spirits Ltd. Voting Outcome (Financial Year 2015)
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United Spirits Ltd. Related Party Footnote (Financial Year 2015)
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